G.R. No. 211289 January 14, 2019, CIR vs. La Flor Dela Isabela

FACTS:
Respondent La Flor dela Isabela, Inc. (La Flor) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Law. It filed monthly returns for the Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) and Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) for calendar year 2005.

On September 3, 2008, La Flor executed a Waiver of the Statute of Limitations (Waiver) in connection with its internal revenue liabilities for the calendar year ending December 31, 2005 and another Waiver on February 16, 2009, to extend the period of assessment until December 31, 2009. 

La Flor received a copy of the Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2005 on November 20, 2009. Another waiver was executed on December 2, 2009.

On January 7, 2010, La Flor received Formal Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notices (FANs) covering the deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2005. All assessment notices were all dated December 17, 2009. 

On January 15, 2010, La Flor filed its Letter of Protest contesting the assessment notices. On July 20, 2010, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) involving the alleged deficiency withholding taxes in the aggregate amount of ₱6,835,994.76. Aggrieved, it filed a petition for review before the CTA Division.

CTA Division Decision

On August 3, 2012, the CTA Division ruled in favor of La Flor. Based on the dates La Flor had filed its returns for EWT and WTC, the CIR had until February 15, 2008 to March 1, 2009 to issue an assessment pursuant to the three-year prescriptive period under Sec. 203 of the NIRC. The assessment was issued on December 17, 2009 which was beyond the prescriptive period.

On the other hand, the Waivers entered into by both parties did not effectively extend the prescriptive period for the issuance of the tax assessments. Waivers dated September 3, 2008 and December 2, 2009 were never presented or offered in evidence. While, Waiver dated February 16, 2009 did not comply with the provisions of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 because it failed to state the nature and amount of the tax to be assessed.

The CIR moved for reconsideration but it was denied. It filed a Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc.

CTA En Banc Decision

On September 30, 2013, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Decision of the CTA Division. The EWT and WTC assessments were barred by prescription. The prescriptive period for the assessment of EWT and WTC for 2005 was not extended in view of the inadmissibility and invalidity of the Waivers between the CIR and La Flor. 

The CIR moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the prescriptive period under Section 203 of the NIRC applies to EWT and WTC assessments.
2. WON La Flor's EWT and WTC assessments for 2005 were barred uy prescription.

HELD:

1. Yes. The prescriptive period under Section 203 of the NIRC applies to EWT and WTC assessments.

Withholding tax assessments such as EWT and WTC clearly contemplate deficiency internal revenue taxes. Their aim is to collect unpaid income taxes and not merely to impose a penalty on the withholding agent for its failure to comply with its statutory duty. Further, a holistic reading of the Tax Code reveals that the CIR's interpretation of Section 203 is erroneous. Based on NIRC Title X Chapter I, Section 247(b) and Section 251,  it is clear to see that the "penalties" are amounts collected on top of the deficiency tax assessments including deficiency withholding tax assessments. Thus, it was wrong for the CIR to restrict the EWT and WTC assessments against La Floras only for the purpose of imposing penalties and not for the collection of internal revenue taxes.

2. Yes. La Flor's EWT and WTC assessment for 2005 were barred by prescription.

The Court invalidated the waivers executed by the taxpayer in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Chartered Bank, because: (1) they were signed by Assistant Commissioner-Large Taxpayers Service and not by the CIR; (2) the date of acceptance was not shown; (3) they did not specify the kind and amount of the tax due; and (4) the waivers speak of a request for extension of time within which to present additional documents and not for reinvestigation and/or reconsideration of the pending internal revenue case as required under RMO No. 20-90. Tested against the requirements of RMO 20-90 and relevant jurisprudence, the Court cannot but agree with the CTA's finding that the waivers subject of this case suffer from the following defects: a) the waivers in this case did not specify the kind of tax and the amount of tax due; b) the September 3, 2008, February 16, 2009 and December 2, 2009 Waivers failed to indicate the specific tax involved and the exact amount of the tax to be assessed or collected. The Waivers did not effectively extend the prescriptive period under Section 203 on account of their invalidity. The issue on whether the CTA was correct in not admitting them as evidence becomes immaterial since even if they were properly offered or considered by the CTA, the same conclusion would be reached — the assessments had prescribed as there was no valid waiver.

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996 Valmonte vs. CA

 

FACTS:

Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife. They are both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. 

 

On March 9, 1992, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, sister of petitioner Lourdes, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals against named spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

 

Apparently, the foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter previously sent by petitioner, Lourdes, to private respondent's counsel in which, in regard to the partition of the property in question, she referred private respondent's counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner, Alfredo, who accepted the summons, insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. 

 

Petitioner (husband) thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner (wife), however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner (husband) entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion.

 

The trial court, denied respondent's motion to declare petitioner, Lourdes, in default. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.

 

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes in default. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

 

HELD:

No valid service on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case. The decision appealed from is reversed and the orders dated July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court are reinstated.

 

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 15 (17a). 

There are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes. First, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo  was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, Sec. 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court. Second, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, Sec. 17. As provided in Sec. 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application. And finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. 

 

Principles:

Service of summons, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either 

(1) by personal service; 

(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or

 (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

G.R. No. 173148, April 06, 2015 ELSA DEGAYO vs. CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, JOHNNY DINGLASAN, et al.

 The present case involves a property dispute, which gave rise to two civil cases for ownership and damages between conflicting claimants over a parcel of land located on the northeastern bank of Jalaud River.

FACTS: 

Lot No. 861, 36,864 sqm. in Dingle, Iloilo, registered in the name of Degayo's deceased parents, was used to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River that serves to separate Dingle from Pototan Iloilo. Opposite is Lot No. 7328, a 153,028 square meter parcel of land, at Pototan, Iloilo. The Jalaud River, which separates these parcels of land, thus flows along the northeast side of Lot 861 and the southwest side of Lot No. 7328.

In 1970's, the Jalauad River steadily changed its course and moved southwards towards the banks of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328 lies, leaving its old riverbed dry. As a result, Lot No. 7328 progressively decreased in size while the banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually increased in land area.

Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a result, her tenants, commenced cultivating and tilling that disputed area with corn and tobacco. The area allegedly added to Lot No. 861 contains 52,528 sqm, came from the 26,106 sqm. original abandoned river bed and 26,419 sqm. resurfaced area of Lot No. 7328. 

CASE No. 16047:  

On October 2, 1984, the respondents filed a complaint against the tenants, arguing that the disputed property was an abandoned riverbed and should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328.

Degayo, the owner, sought to intervene but her motion was denied. However, she was able to participate in the proceedings as a witness for the defense. She testified on the same matters and raised the same arguments she alleged in her complaint in Civil Case No. 18328.

On May 7, 1996, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, rendered its decision in favor of the respondents. The tenants promptly filed an appeal but they failed to file an appeal brief. Thus, the decision in became final and executory on August 6, 1999.

CASE No. 18328:

Instead of filing petition for certiorari, Degayo initiated a suit against the respondents. In her complaint, Degayo alleged to have acquired Lot No. 861 by inheritance and stressed that the area in dispute was an accretion to Lot No. 861.

The court found in favor of Degayo and declared the property in question as an accretion to Lot No. 861. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, the respondents filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 7, 2005, the CA granted the respondents' appeal and reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 18328.

Degayo sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision but the CA denied her motion in its May 19, 2006 Resolution. Aggrieved, Degayo filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.

ISSUES:

1. WON CA erred in declaring the disputed property as an abandoned riverbed and not an accretion to Lot 861.

2. WON CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 16047, which was not even presented during the hearing of the present case.

3. WON CA erred in declaring the RTC Branch 27 decision in Civil Case No. 16047 conclusive upon Degayo when she was not even a party in the said Civil case.

HELD: 

1. CA is correct in declaring that the disputed property is an abandoned riverbed and not an accretion. 

The Supreme Court noted that the ownership of the disputed parcel of land has been unequivocally settled in Civil Case No. 16047. RTC opined that the claim of accretion has no valid basis. The Jalaud River naturally changed its course and moved southward which resulted to abandonment of its previous bed and encroached upon a portion of Lot No. 7328. It further held that the claim of accretion could not be sustained because the 26,419 sqm. portion is ostensibly within the metes and bounds of Lot No. 7328. On the other hand, the 26,106 sqm. portion refers to an abandoned river bed, and is thus governed by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which states that River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

2. CA is correct in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case NO. 16047.

SC ruled that CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 16047. At present case, there was no denial of the existence and the decision in Civil Case No. 16047. In fact, Degayo stated on record her full knowledge of Civil Case No. 16047 and clearly and frequently referred to it in her pleadings, and sufficiently designated it by name, parties, cause of action and docket number from the court a quo, to the CA and even before this Court. Under the circumstances, the CA could certainly take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in Civil Case No. 16047. There was no sense in relitigating issues that have already been passed upon in a previous civil case. 

3. CA is correct in declaring the RTC Branch 27 decision in Civil Case 16047 conclusive upon Degayo.

The decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata. SC found that there is an identity of parties in Civil Case No. 16047 and the present case. There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are "successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.

Principles:

1. Article 461 of the Civil Code, which states that River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

2. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, this rule is not absolute.

3. Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009 SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP vs. ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA

Rosalie Chua who owns Roferxane Bldg. located in Paranaque, entered into a 6-year lease contract with spouses Latip for 2 cubicles in the building on December 1999.

A year later as the cubicles were occupied by spouses Latip, Chua filed a complaint in the MeTC for unlawful detainer to spouses Latip after repeatedly ignoring demand letters of payment from Chua for back rentals. In their answer, spouses Latip asserted that sometime on Oct. 1999, Chua offered for sale the lease rights over the 2 cubicles in which spouses Latip paid for as evidence by 3 receipts for the total amount of P2,570,000.

MeTC ruled in favor of Chua thus evicting spouses Latip from the building.

Spouses Latip appealed in the RTC and such court ruled to reverse the MeTC's decision. RTC says that they did not find the lease contract credible as it was not notarized and some substantial information are not complete. RTC believes spouses Latip’s claim that the contract was modified and paid in full. Chua refutes saying that the P2,570,000 is payment for goodwill by prospective lessees. RTC declared and existent lease for the period of 6 years that was fully paid and that spouses Latip should not be evicted until the lease period expires.

Chua appeals to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the MeTC decision. CA says that although lacking some elements the contract presented by Chua is still valid. CA says that the P2,570,000 payment was that of goodwill as it took JUDICIAL NOTICE to common practices in Baclaran area. The JUDICIAL NOTICE of such practice was based and supported by the joint sworn declaration of stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. That they paid goodwill to Chua before occupying the stalls.

Hence spouses Latip appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. WON spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.

2. WON CA erred, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip,  in taking judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor. 

HELD:

1. SC ruled that as the contract of lease has already expired in 2005, spouses Latip can be ejected. They are liable to Chua for the unpaid rentals according to the stipulations of the lease contract but the amount of P2,570,000 shall be deducted from such liability as advanced rentals

2. SC disagreed in the taking of judicial notice of CA. 

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As what was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007, CIR vs Primetown Property Group, Inc.

FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, his business was good on the first quarter of 1997 but then the increase of labor and materials made it difficult in obtaining financing projects, hence suffered losses on that same year. Respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit, invoking Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA: The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petition filed by respondent is within the 2-year prescriptive period.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period. CIR's petition was DENIED. 

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not. The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. 

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, the court ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. 

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, The Court holds that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, from April 15, 1998 up to April 14, 2000.

G.R. No. L-14519. July 26, 1960 Republic vs Ablaza

FACTS:

Collector of Internal Revenue assessed income taxes for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 on the income tax returns of defendant-appellee Luis G. Ablaza, amounting to P5,254.70. The accountants for Ablaza requested a reinvestigation of tax liability, on the following grounds:
    (1) the assessment is erroneous and incomplete; 
    (2) the assessment is based on third-party information, and 

    (3) neither the taxpayer nor his accountants were permitted to appear in person.

The petition for reinvestigation was granted. Days after, the accountants for Ablaza again sent another letter to the Collector of Internal Revenue submitting a copy of their own computation. And on March 10, 1954, the accountants for Ablaza sent a letter to the examiner of accounts and collections of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, stating a portion which:

"In this connection, we wish to state that this case is presently under reinvestigation as per our request dated October 16, 1951, and your letter to us dated October 17, 1951, and that said tax liability being only a tentative assessment, we are not as yet advised of the results of the requested reinvestigation.

In view thereof, we wish to request, in fairness to the taxpayer concerned, that we be furnished a copy of the detailed computation of the alleged tax liability as soon as the reinvestigation is terminated to enable us to prove the veracity of the taxpayer’s side of the case, and if it is found out that said assessment is proper and in order, we assure you of our assistance in the speedy disposition of this case." 

After the reinvestigation, Collector of Internal Revenue made a final assessment of amounted to P2,066.56. Notice of the said assessment was sent and upon receipt thereof the accountants of Ablaza, on its letter dated May 8, 1957, protested the assessments on the ground that the income taxes are no longer collectible for the reason that they have already prescribed. 

The Collector did not agree to the alleged claim of prescription, thus, an action was instituted by him in the Court of First Instance. The said court upheld the contention of Ablaza. Hence, an appeal was filed asserting that the prescriptive period has not fully run at the time of the assessment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action to collect the assessed income taxes had prescribed.

HELD:

Yes. The Court finds the appeal without merit and hereby affirms the judgment of the lower court dismissing the action without costs.

 

Upon request of Ablaza's accountants dated October 14, 1951 for reinvestigation of the assessment of the income taxes against him, the period of prescription of action to collect the taxes was suspended. (Sec. 333, C. A. No. 466.) The provision of law on prescription was adopted in statute books upon recommendation of the tax commissioner of the Philippines which declares:

"Under the former law, the right of the Government to collect the tax does not prescribe. However, in fairness to the taxpayer, the Government should be estopped from collecting the tax where it failed to make the necessary investigation and assessment within 5 years after the filing of the return and where it failed to collect the tax within 5 years from the date of assessment thereof. Just as the government is interested in the stability of its collections, so also are the taxpayers entitled to an assurance that they will not be subjected to further investigation for tax purposes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time." (Vol. II, Report of the Tax Commission of the Philippines, pp. 321-322)

The law on prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted in a way conducive to bringing about the beneficient purpose of affording protection to the taxpayer within the contemplation of the Commission which recommend the approval of the law.

The question in the case at bar boils down to the interpretation of the letter dated March 10, 1954, quoted above. If said letter be interpreted as a request for further investigation or a new investigation, different and distinct from the investigation demanded or prayed for in Ablaza’s first letter, then the period of prescription would continue to be suspended thereby. But if the letter in question does not ask for another investigation, the result would be just the opposite. In the Court's opinion, the letter in question does not ask for another investigation. Nowhere does the letter imply a demand or request for a different or new and distinct reinvestigation from that already requested and, therefore, the said letter may not be interpreted to authorize or justify the continuance of the suspension of the period of limitations.

G.R. Nos. 135695-96 October 12, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS TUNDAG

FACTS:  

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutor’s Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. She alleged that Tomas Tundag, being the father of complainant who is a 13-year old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s will. 

Tomas Tundag pleaded not guilty of the charges. His defense was bare denial claiming that his daughter, Mary Ann fabricated the rape against him since they had a quarrel when he reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home. Thus, there’s no witness to reinforce his testimony. 

On August 31, 1998, the court rendered its decision, finding the appellant guilty of 2 counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.

Complainant contended that on September 5, 1997 in the evening, she was in the house together with her father and illustrated how she was being raped by the accused. Another rape incident happened on the evening of November 7, 1997, after she finished washing the dishes. This time a very sharp knife which his father was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid. On the following day, she went to her neighbour, Bebie Cabahug, and told her everything that her father did. They then reported the matter to the police and went to the Southern Island Hospital where she was examined and have her medical examination. She was then brought back to the police for further investigations.

Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Appellant flatly denied and contended that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy. On November 7, 1997, he claimed he was at work. In his brief, he argued that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court committed an error in not absolving the accused-appellant of the crimes charged in the informations despite the presence of reasonable doubt to exculpate him of the same.

2. WON it was correct for the Court to take judicial notice of Mary Ann’s age without a hearing.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The Court found no room to disturb the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.

Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor. Indeed, the Court found that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent. Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.

2. No. To take judicial notice on Mary Ann's age without a hearing is improper.

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel's admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution's motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129 as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.