REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU AND NOEL AGUSTIN vs. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO represented by SYLVIA R. ASPERILLA G.R. No. 204964 October 15, 2014

 

On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) was enacted. On October 10, 2000, del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia R. Asperilla (Asperilla), filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage.

 

On February 19, 2004, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Secretary Pagdanganan issued an order granting the application for exemption. Citing Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, Secretary Pagdanganan stated that lands classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.

 

On March 26, 2004, farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Espiritu, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. They argued that under Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Resolution No. 705, Series of 2001, and Angeles City Council Resolution No. 3300, Series of 2001, the land holdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial. They argued that as per certifications by the HLURB, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed that reclassified the area into other land uses.

 

Secretary Pangandaman issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration and revoking the earlier order of then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Pagdanganan. Secretary Pangandaman found that the certifications issued by the HLURB classified the landholdings as agricultural before June 15, 1988. Based on the ocular inspections conducted by the Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI), the land remained agricultural and was planted with sugar cane and corn. 

 

Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President on March 27, 2008. The Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite, rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.

 

 

Q: Is Secretary Pangandaman correct in revoking the earlier order of then Secretary Pagdanganan?

 

Yes, Secretary Pangandaman is correct in revoking the earlier order of then Secretary Pagdanganan.

 

Lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or its predecessors prior to June 15, 1998 are outside the coverage of the compulsory acquisition program of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, there has to be substantial evidence to prove that lands sought to be exempted fall within the non-agricultural classification.

 

Accordingly, lands are considered exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 if the following requisites are present:

1. Lands were zoned for non-agricultural use by the local government unit; and

2. The zoning ordinance was approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board before June 15, 1998.

 

In this case, the above requisites are lacking. The land has ceased to be agricultural by virtue of reclassification under Ordinance No. 13, series of 1978 cannot be sustained since the records of the case or the evidence presented thereto are bereft of any indication showing the same. In fact, based on certification from CPDO-ZAU, the land was classified as agricultural. Said land as verified with HLURB-Region III was also classified as agriculture. And lastly, upon ocular inspection, it was found that the same area remained agricultural as it was still dominantly planted with sugar cane and corn.

HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO DELFIN AND SOLEDAD DELFIN v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G.R. No. 193618 November 28, 2016

Delfin Spouses owned a 28,800 square meter parcel of land in Townsite, Suarez, Iligan City.  Sometime in 1982, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) forcibly took possession of a 10,798 square meter portion of the property. Despite their repeated demands for compensation, the NHA failed to pay the value of the property. The Delfin Spouses thus, filed their Complaint for "Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and Damages".

In a letter to the Director of Lands in 1987, it was indicated that the Iligan Property was already occupied by June 1945 and that it had already released for agricultural purposes in favor of its occupants. Before Deputy Public Land Inspector recommended the issuance of a patent in favor of petitioner, upon investigation in the premises of the land, it was found and ascertained that the land was first entered, occupied and possessed and cultivated by him since the year June 1945 up to the present.

NHA alleged that the Delfin Spouses' property was part of a military reservation area. It cited Proclamation No. 2143 as having supposedly reserved the area in which property is situated for Iligan City's slum improvement and resettlement program, and the relocation of families who were dislocated by the National Steel Corporation's five-year expansion program.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the NHA in default, rendering a Decision in favor of the Delfin Spouses. On NHA’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s Decision:

The Court of Appeals ruled that the characterization of the property is no longer an issue because the NHA already conceded that the property is disposable public land by citing Proclamation No. 2143, which characterized the property as "a certain disposable parcel of public land." However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to establish their possession of the property since June 12, 1945, as required in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

Q: Are petitioners entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent National Housing Authority?\

Yes, petitioners are entitled to just compensation for the Iligan City property occupied by respondent National Housing Authority.

The right to be justly compensated whenever private property is taken for public use cannot be disputed. Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states that Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. While petitioners may not claim title by prescription, they may, nevertheless, claim title pursuant to Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act).

Section 48 enabled the confirmation of claims and issuance of titles in favor of citizens occupying or claiming to own lands of the public domain or an interest therein. Section 48 (b) specifically pertained to those who "have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945":

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act therefore requires that two (2) requisites be satisfied before claims of title to public domain lands may be confirmed: first, that the land subject of the claim is agricultural land; and second, open, continuous, notorious, and exclusive possession of the land since June 12, 1945.

In this case, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan Property pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. First, there is no issue that the Iligan Property had already been declared to be alienable and disposable land. Second, Deputy Public Land Inspector’s letters to the Director of Land nevertheless attest to a previous finding that the property had already been occupied as early as June 1945.

Having shown that the requisites of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act have been satisfied and having established their rights to the Iligan Property, it follows that petitioners must be compensated for its taking.