Spouses Mamaril are
jeepney operators since 1971. They would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys
every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound located at 181
Concepcion Street, Malate, Manila for a fee of ₱300.00 per month for each unit.
On May 26, 1995, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. The
following morning, however, one of the vehicles was missing and was never
recovered. According to the security guards Peña and Gaddi of AIB Security
Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security and
protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle
out of the compound.
Sps. Mamaril filed a
complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against BSP,
AIB, Peña and Gaddi. BSP denied any liability contending that not only did Sps.
Mamaril directly deal with AIB with respect to the manner by which the parked
vehicles would be handled, but the parking ticket itself expressly stated
that the "Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or any
of its accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that Sps.
Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being
parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties,
its officers, and employees.
In addition, AIB
alleged that it has observed due diligence in the selection, training and
supervision of its security guards while Peña and Gaddi claimed that the person
who drove out the lost vehicle from the BSP compound represented himself as the
owners' authorized driver and had with him a key to the subject vehicle.
RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of Sps. Mamaril. The RTC found that the act of Peña and Gaddi
in allowing the entry of an unidentified person and letting him drive out the
subject vehicle in violation of their internal agreement with Sps. Mamaril
constituted gross negligence, rendering AIB and its security guards liable for
the former's loss. BSP was also adjudged liable because the Guard Service
Contract it entered into with AIB offered protection to all properties inside
the BSP premises, which necessarily included Sps. Mamaril's vehicles. Moreover,
the said contract stipulated AIB's obligation to indemnify BSP for all losses
or damages that may be caused by any act or negligence of its security guards.
Accordingly, the BSP, AIB, and security guards Peña and Gaddi were held jointly
and severally liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
Only BSP appealed
the foregoing disquisition before the CA. The CA affirmed the finding of
negligence on the part of security guards Peña and Gaddi. However, it absolved
BSP from any liability, holding that the Guard Service Contract is purely
between BSP and AIB and that there was nothing therein that would indicate any
obligation and/or liability on the part of BSP in favor of third persons, such
as Sps. Mamaril.
It further ruled
that the agreement between Sps. Mamaril and BSP was substantially a contract of
lease whereby the former paid parking fees to the latter for the lease of
parking slots. As such, the lessor, BSP, was not an insurer nor bound to take
care and/or protect the lessees' vehicles.
On the matter of
damages, the CA deleted the award of ₱50,000.00 representing the value of the
accessories inside the lost vehicle and the ₱275.00 a day for loss of income in
the absence of proof to support them. It also deleted the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal bases.
Q1: Should BSP be
held liable for the loss of their vehicle based on the Guard Service Contract
and the parking ticket it issued?
No, BSP should not
be held liable for the loss of vehicle based on the Guard Service Contract and
the parking ticket it issued.
In order that a
third person benefited by the second paragraph of Article 1311, referred to as
a stipulation pour autrui, may demand its fulfillment, the following requisites
must concur: (1) There is a stipulation in favor of a third person; (2) The
stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) The contracting
parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person - the
favor is not merely incidental; (4) The favor is unconditional and
uncompensated; (5) The third person communicated his or her acceptance of the
favor before its revocation; and (6) The contracting parties do not represent,
or are not authorized, by the third party.
However, none of the
foregoing elements obtains in this case. It is undisputed that Sps. Mamaril are
not parties to the Guard Service Contract. Neither did the subject
agreement contain any stipulation pour autrui. The Guard Service Contract
between defendant-appellant BSP and defendant AIB Security Agency is purely
between the parties therein.
Moreover, the
contract between the parties herein was one of lease as defined under
Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It has been held that the act of parking a
vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed amount, is a lease. Article
1654 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessor (BSP) is obliged: (1) to
deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to
render it fit for the use intended; (2) to make on the same during the lease
all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it
has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; and (3) to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the
entire duration of the contract." In relation thereto, Article 1664 of the
same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act
of trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but
the lessee shall have a direct action against the intruder."
In the instant case,
the owners parked passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee
and took the keys home with them. Hence, a lessor-lessee relationship
indubitably existed between them and BSP. BSP was not remiss in its obligation
to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it even
hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held
liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
Q2: Is the CA’s
decision correct in deleting the RTC awards of damages and attorney's fees.
Article 20 of the
Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In this case, it is
undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was
the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified
person to drive out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the
result would not have occurred.
The mishandling of
the parked vehicles that resulted in herein complained loss should be recovered
only from the tort feasors (Peña and Gaddi) and their employer, AIB; and not
against the lessor, BSP. More so, on the matter of damages, Sps. Mamaril failed
to substantiate their claim and provide sufficient justification. It is
axiomatic that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty and a party is entitled only to such compensation for the pecuniary
loss that was duly proven. Thus, absent any competent proof of the amount of
damages sustained, the CA properly deleted the said awards.
