REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES DANILO & AMORLINA GO G.R. No. 197297 August 02, 2017

 

Respondents Spouses Go applied for the registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covering an area of 1,000 square meters. It was registered under their names for taxation purposes. They had paid the real property taxes, including the arrears. They claimed to be in an open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and actual possession of the property for seven (7) years since they bought it. They also tacked their possession through that of their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:

Sometime in 1945, Anselmo came to know that his parents, Sergia and Andres de Torres, owned Lot No. 4699, a bigger property where Lot No. 4699-B came from. According to Anselmo, the Spouses de Torres paid the real property taxes during their lifetime and planted bananas, mangoes, calamansi, and rice on this lot. In the 1960, Anselmo and his siblings inherited Lot No. 4699 from their parents upon their deaths.

 

On 2000, the Spouses Go bought Lot No. 4699-B from the previous owners evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

 

Spouses Go, on their application for registration and confirmation of title, attached the Report of Special Land Investigator and the Certification from CENRO and DENR. The Report and Certification stated that the property was located in an alienable and disposable zone. And no patent or decree was previously issued over the property.

Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) opposed respondents' application for registration for the following reasons: 1) Lot No. 4699-B was part of the public domain; 2) neither the Spouses Go nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property; 3) the tax declaration and payment were not competent or sufficient proof of ownership, especially considering that these were relatively recent.

Q: If you were the judge, how will you decide on this case?

 

A: If I were the judge, I would deny the application for registration and confirmation of title for lack of merit.

 

The 1987 Constitution declares that the State owns all public lands. Public lands are classified into agricultural, mineral, timber or forest, and national parks. Of these four (4) types of public lands, only agricultural lands may be alienated. In applying confirmation of title, the applicant has the burden of proving that the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable. To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government declassifying the land from the public domain and converting it into an alienable and disposable land.

 

In this case, the pieces of evidence the Spouses Go adduced fall short of the requirements of the law. First, the Spouses Go was required by the court but failed to present a certified true copy of the original classification of the DENR Secretary. Although a report and certification from CENRO was attached to the application, this CENRO certification is issued only to verify the DENR Secretary issuance through a survey. Thus, the CENRO Certification should have been accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. A CENRO certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alienability and disposability of land sought to be registered.

 

Second, the Spouses Go have the burden to show that the land for registration is alienable or disposable, which they miserably failed to do so. Without the original land classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the Spouses Go's application for registration must be denied. The land remains inalienable.

HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA vs. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE MALUPENG G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016

Spouses Delfin and Maria Tappa filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng. The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters.

In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa. Spouses Tappa claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial.

 

Respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in tum passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud. Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta. The 1963 affidavit which was notarized stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that one-half of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.

Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed Demetria, and another executed by Juanita. Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Pantaleon. Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as heir of Irene. Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.

Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and intimidation. Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.

 

Q1: Will the action of Spouses Tappa for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages prosper?

 

A: No, the action of Souses Tappa for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages will not prosper. Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, it provides that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Unfortunately, Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.

 

In the first requisite, Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable title to or an interest in the property. Spouses Tappa's claim of legal title by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title issued in their name cannot stand. The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects. whatsoever. Private ownership of land-as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.

 

As to the second requisite for an action to quiet title, an instrument, the 1963 Affidavit, which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses Tappa's title, was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property. A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title. Aside from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving. Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution. Hence, the 1963 Affidavit is no doubt an instrument which appears to be valid as it was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription.

 

           

Q2: Is Certificate of Title collaterally attacked in this case?

 

A: No, Certificate of Title was not collaterally attacked in this case. Section 48 of PD 1529, provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." This rule is not applicable in this case. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds. By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document." Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.

In this case, what respondents dispute is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. Respondents claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of their occupied portions. Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.